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Morality and the Legal Enterprise-A Reply to
Professor Summers
Daniel E. Wueste
A number of commentators have reviewed Professor Robert S.
Summers's 1984 book, Lon L.Fuller;' my own review,2 accompanied
by Professor Summers's "wholly disinterested" response,3 appears
in the present issue of this journal. Professor Summers devotes
much of his piece to an assessment of a review by Professor Paul E.
LeBel.4 The tenor of that assessment differs markedly from that of
the rest of Professor Summers's response, and while I am tempted
to speculate as to the reasons for that difference, I will confine my
remarks to Professor Summers's considered response to my own
review.
In my review, I said that Professor Summers appears to have
come over to the view that Fuller's "inner morality of law" is a mo-
rality. I chose my words carefully. For while a change in his view of
Fuller's work was evident as early as 1975,5 culminating in his
book's "decidedly sympathetic"6 account of Fuller's jurisprudence,
never did Professor Summers explicitly accept Fuller's claim that the
principles of legality constitute a morality. For me, whether Profes-
sor Summers had "converted" remained an open question.
It now emerges that what I had regarded and thus cautiously
presented as, perhaps, mere appearance is indeed the case. For, as
Professor Summers states in his reply to critics, having "reread
Fuller prior to writing my book on his work .... I now believe that
Fuller's principles of legality do have a justified claim to being a mo-
rality."7 Something else emerges as well. When Professor Summers
presents his "most compelling" 8 argument in support of Fuller's
claim, an argument that Fuller himself never made, he does not dis-
1 R. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER (1984).
2 Wueste, Fuller's Processual Philosophy of Law (Book Review), 71 CORNELL L. REV.
1205 (1986).
3 Summers, Summers's Primer on Fuller'sJurisprudence-A Wholly Disinterested Assessment
of the Reviews by Professors Wueste and LeBel, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1231 (1986).
4 LeBel, Blame this Messenger: Summers on Fuller (Book Review), 83 MICH. L. REV. 717
(1985).
5 See Summers, Present State of Legal Theory in the United States, 6 RECHTSTHEORIE 65,
79-80 (1975).
6 R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at vii.
7 Summers, supra note 3, at 1234.
8 Id.
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tance himself from it, claiming merely to state an argument he does
not accept in a more persuasive way. No, Professor Summers
presents an argument that he finds persuasive-indeed, compelling.
It is an argument for a claim he accepts, namely, that the principles
Fuller identifies constitute a morality. Moreover, he maintains that
the position he advocates is secure. He is a convert.
In his brief reply to critics, Professor Summers explains his con-
version by pointing to the arguments summarized in his book. One
such argument received special attention in my review. Specifically,
Professor Summers argues that (1) Fuller's theory, as I interpret it,
"could not serve all of the essential purposes Fuller seems to have
intended," 9 and (2) quite apart from the fidelity of my interpretation
of Fuller, his argument is superior to mine because it is "simpler
and more straightforward [and] does not depend on the social facts
required to specify the roles which must figure in Professor
Wueste's defense of an internal morality of law."10 In short, as Pro-
fessor Summers sees it, not only is his argument more Fullerian
than my argument, it is also more straightforward and therefore
preferable to mine.
Professor Summers's argument is simple, reasonably straight-
forward, and-unlike my argument-does not depend on social
facts. Yet, despite Summers's valiant defense, the argument is
somewhat less than compelling. In what follows, I will briefly state
the reasons behind this judgment. I will also speak to the issue of
whether my interpretation of Fuller's theory is such that his "essen-
tial purposes" cannot be realized.
I
A GUARANTEE OF FAIRNESS?
The central claim in Professor Summers's fairness argument is
that compliance with Fuller's principles "necessarily guarantees...
the realization of a moral value." I I Identifying the value in ques-
tion, Professor Summers speaks of "a fair opportunity to obey the
law."' 2 He also speaks of it, somewhat more perspicuously I think,
as "fair warning of the adversity" that "ordinarily" follows disobedi-
ence "and an opportunity for choice in the matter (however
hard)."' 13 In my review I said that this claim is doubtful on two
counts. First, "it is hard to see how compliance with a set of princi-
ples that does not completely disallow retroactivity ... necessarily
9 Id. at 1237.
10 Id. at 1238.
11 R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 37.
12 Id. at 37 (emphasis in original).
13 Summers, supra note 3, at 1235.
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guarantees that citizens have a fair opportunity to obey the law." 14
Second, looking at the situation of a blackmailer's victim, one may
well hesitate to embrace Professor Summers's claim that being fore-
warned of adversity in case of noncompliance with a directive and
having an opportunity for choice in the matter is in itself moral. 15
Professor Summers responds to the first point by noting that
"[o]bedience is simply not the object" of the sort of retroactive stat-
ute Fuller's principles would allow (that is, a "curative" law).16
Granting that his fairness argument cannot come into play "if obedi-
ence cannot be an issue," he indicates that it was not intended to
apply in such a case. 17 Later we are told, in no uncertain terms, that
this argument comes into play "where a citizen's obedience is involved."'' 8
Thus, it emerges that the argument comes into play when and only
when citizen obedience is an issue.
The question that arises at this juncture is whether the desider-
ata that make up the internal morality of law are ultimately con-
cerned with the possibility of obedience. As it happens, Fuller poses
and answers this question in a footnote in his book, The Morality of
Law. t9 As Fuller says,
There is no question that the matter may be viewed in this light.
Just as it is impossible to obey a law that requires one to become
ten feet tall, so it is also impossible to obey a law that cannot be
known, that is unintelligible, that has not yet been enacted, etc. 20
So far so good. Yet, I think it is significant that, in an effort to justify
the "separation effected in the text," 2' that is, to justify his position
that the internal morality of law is not "reducible to fewer than eight
principles," 22 Fuller goes on to say the following:
[M]y concern is not to engage in an exercise in logical entailment,
but to develop principles for the guidance of purposive human
effort .... From the standpoint of the lawmaker .... there is an
essential difference between the precautions he must take to keep
his enactments consistent with one another and those he must
take to be sure that the requirements of the law lie within the pow-
ers of those subject to them. Essential differences of this sort
would be obscured by any attempt to telescope everything under
14 Wueste, supra note 2, at 1209.
15 Id. at 1209-10; cf. Summers, supra note 3, at 1235-36.
16 Summers, supra note 3, at 1235.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1240 (emphasis added).
19 L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
20 Id. at 70 n.29.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 258. These words appear in the second index entry under the heading
"Internal morality of law." The entry marks the location of Fuller's remarks respecting
"the separation effected in the text." Id. at 70 n.29.
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the head of "impossibility of obedience." '23
In short, recognizing that the desiderata of the internal morality of
law may be viewed as Professor Summers would have us view them,
Fuller nevertheless holds that these desiderata are not ultimately
concerned with the possibility of obedience.
In his book, Professor Summers tells us that Fuller never explic-
itly set forth the fairness argument. In my review I invited attention
to an element of Fuller's position that helps to explain this fact,
namely, that the principles of his internal morality of law do not
completely disallow retroactive legislation. Somewhat ironically,
Professor Summers's response hints at what is perhaps the best ex-
planation of why Fuller never makes the fairness argument. For as
we have seen, (1) Fuller eschews the suggestion that the desiderata
of the internal morality of law are ultimately concerned with the
possibility of obedience, and (2) Professor Summers's fairness argu-
ment comes into play when and only when citizen obedience is an
issue. Thus, that Fuller did not set forth such an argument comes as
no surprise. Indeed, it would be quite surprising to find that he had.
Professor Summers seems to confront a dilemma. On the one
hand, if he stands by his fairness argument, he is vulnerable to the
charge that his argument for Fuller's internal morality of law is
rather non-Fullerian. The other hand is no better. For if the argu-
ment is supposed to be faithful to the position Fuller in fact em-
braces, it is vulnerable to the first objection raised in my review.
Professor Summers holds that having both forewarning of ad-
versity in case of noncompliance with a directive and an opportunity
for choice in the matter is "in itself moral."'24 It is important that
such a fair opportunity to obey is in itself moral, for Professor Sum-
mers maintains that such an opportunity is the moral value realiza-
tion of which is necessarily guaranteed by "official conformity to
Fuller's principles." 25 Putting aside the issue of the guarantee and
focusing on whether such an opportunity is in itself moral, I thought
it noteworthy that a victim of blackmail will almost certainly be fore-
warned of adversity in case of noncompliance and have an opportu-
nity for choice in the matter. Indeed, as I suggested in my review,
this circumstance may give one cause to doubt Professor Summers's
claim that a fair opportunity to obey is in itself moral.
In light of his response to this observation it appears that Pro-
fessor Summers believes such an opportunity is to be counted a
moral value whenever and wherever it exists. Thus, as I understand
his remarks respecting the blackmail example, Professor Summers
23 Id. at 70 n.29.
24 R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 37.
25 Summers, supra note 3, at 1235.
1986] 1255
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
would urge us to grant that a moral value has been realized so long
as the directions the blackmailer gives to his victim are not such
"that in the end the victim is exposed even though he may have
tried his best to go along."26 In short, a moral value is realized
here, provided that the victim has "a fair opportunity to go along
with the scheme in its entirety," 27 as he will when, for example, the
blackmailer's directions are not "unclear or otherwise impossible to
follow." 28
The brevity of Professor Summers's response to my discussion
of this example took me by surprise. For, following Fuller, I had
suggested that the character and color of an end such as the oppor-
tunity in question derive in part from the means by which the end is
realized. Although this suggestion elicited no direct response, Pro-
fessor Summers later makes some germane remarks in his reply to
Professor LeBel. Reporting first that it had not occurred to him that
"fairness, as such, might not be a moral value," 29 Professor Sum-
mers also indicates that, like "countless other moral and legal theo-
rists," he embraces "the almost universal assumption" that "fairness
is paradigmatically a moral value." 30
I must confess that it is not clear to me what "fairness, as such"
is. I have similar difficulties with the notion of "freedom, as such"
or "equality, as such." Like Fuller, I tend to think of fairness, free-
dom, and equality as social objectives. And, again like Fuller, I am
inclined to think that when a social objective is considered in ab-
straction from the means of its realization, it either "loses substance
and descends to the level of a kind of metaphor"31 or, still worse,
becomes little more than "a formless end-utility, like the pleasure of
eating or the comfort of keeping warm." 3 2 For just as means are
shaped and stamped by the ends they secure, ends are shaped and
stamped by their means of realization.
Approaching the blackmailer example from this perspective,
one is in a position to grant (or not grant) that the victim has been
given a fair opportunity to go along with the scheme but deny that, eo
ipso, a moral value is realized. Professor Summers is in a rather dif-
ferent position for two reasons. First, given that the blackmailer's
victim has been forewarned of adversity in case of noncompliance
26 Id. at 1236.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1239.
30 Id.
31 L. FULLER, supra note 19, at 24; see L. FULLER, Means and Ends, in THE PRINCIPLES
OF SOCIAL ORDER 42 (K. Winston ed. 1981).
32 L. FULLER, Means and Ends, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 57 (K. Winston
ed. 1981).
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and has an opportunity for choice in the matter, Professor Summers
can hardly deny that-to use his words-the victim has "a fair op-
portunity to go along" with the scheme. After all, in Professor Sum-
mers's view, what we have here are two ways of saying the same
thing. Second, holding to the "almost universal assumption" cited
above, Professor Summers cannot deny, save at pain of contradic-
tion, that even in this sordid instance of a power relation,33 a moral
value is realized.
Faced with such a requirement of consistency, or more pre-
cisely, seeing that one's position is such that one has to accept a
conclusion that is, at the very least, counter intuitive, I for one
would be inclined to question the premises that force me to accept
it. Indeed, I pointed to the example of blackmail in order to suggest
that, inasmuch as the assumptions underlying Professor Summers's
fairness argument lead to such a conclusion, they are subject to
doubt. But Professor Summers will have none of it. He is unwilling
to grant either (1) that it may be a mistake to regard the mere exist-
ence of forewarning of adversity in case of noncompliance and the
opportunity to make a choice in the matter as a sure indication that
the moral value of fairness has been realized, or (2) that a fair oppor-
tunity to obey-that is, being forewarned and so on-is not to be
counted a moral value whenever and wherever it exists. Thus one
finds Professor Summers ending his discussion of the matter with
the observation that "affording a person fair warning and a genuine
opportunity to go along" might be "morally better ... than if no
such chance were provided."34 Is it not more accurate to say that
this is not a matter of morality, but one of efficiency in the realiza-
tion of the blackmailer's goal? The leader of a "blackmailers' guild"
might instruct new members always to provide their victims with
such a chance; indeed, he might even say that what one is trying to
do could hardly be called blackmail if such a chance were not pro-
vided. In short, Professor Summers's argument for Fuller's internal
morality of law is vulnerable to the sort of objection he and others
raised in 1965. Moreover, because Professor Summers's argument
invokes an abstract conception of a social objective (that is, an ob-
jective defined in abstraction from the means of its realization), it
seems to be rather non-Fullerian. Fuller plainly considers it a
profound but common mistake to suppose that a social objective can
be understood "in abstraction from the means of realizing it." 3 5
33 For an interesting discussion of "this sordid power relation," see L. FULLER, I"i-
gation and Tyranny, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 196 (K. Winston ed. 1981).
34 Summers, supra note 3, at 1236.
35 L. FULLER, supra note 32, at 62.
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II
SERVING FULLER'S "ESSENTIAL PURPOSES"
Commenting on the alternative argument for an internal moral-
ity of law presented in my review, Professor Summers expresses
doubt that Fuller's theory, as I interpret it, could "serve all of the
essential purposes Fuller seems to have intended."3 6 As I interpret
Fuller, his internal morality of law is a social morality; more pre-
cisely, it "is the morality of a process of social ordering, it is a moral-
ity that sets out the role responsibilities of the parties involved in it
in the form of principles that summarize the stable interactional ex-
pectancies associated with the process." 37 But Professor Summers
argues, "Fuller wanted to refute those positivists who denied a nec-
essary connection between law and critical morality. Moreover,
Fuller viewed his principles of legality as standards of moral criti-
cism." 38 In short, Professor Summers finds my interpretation of
Fuller to be "mistaken in an important way. '39
It is a commonplace that Fuller sought to refute "the general
positivist doctrine that there is no necessary connection between law
and morality" 40 by pointing to the morality that makes law possi-
ble-"the internal morality of law itself. '4 1 It is also a commonplace
that this doctrine 42 addresses the issue of the relationship between
law and critical morality. Putting two and two together, it seems
that Fuller's position is both perspicuously and precisely summa-
rized by saying that he wanted to refute the positivists' claim that
there is no necessary connection between law and critical morality.
And, in fact, such a summary statement is a basic element in the
received view of Fuller's legal philosophy. Thus, the challenge Pro-
fessor Summers presents is one that any critic of the received view
must meet.
What needs to be shown, I think, is that as Fuller understands
what has come to be called the separability thesis, one need not ar-
gue that there is a necessary connection between law and critical mo-
rality in order to discredit it. I made some efforts in that direction in
my review,43 efforts which Professor Summers acknowledges but re-
36 Summers, supra note 3, at 1237.
37 Wueste, supra note 2, at 1229.
38 Summers, supra note 3, at 1237 (emphasis in original).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1233.
41 Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630, 645 (1958).
42 As I indicated in my review, precisely what this doctrine amounts to is less clear
than is generally supposed. See Wueste, supra note 2, at 1206.
43 Wueste, supra note 2, at 1227.
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gards as suggestive only of ambivalence on Fuller's part.44 Unfortu-
nately, in the limited space available to me here, I cannot provide a
complete showing of what needs to be shown. Indeed, I can do little
more than offer some brief remarks which will, perhaps, suggest
something other than ambivalence.
It is granted on all sides that, according to Fuller, the morality
internal to law belies the positivist's "strict separation of law and
morality."' 45 The question here is whether Fuller understands the
issue presented by the separability doctrine in the way I have sug-
gested. In his well-known response 46 to Hart's Positivism and the Sep-
aration of Law and Morals,47 Fuller identifies the issue by means of a
contrast. What is at issue here, he says, is quite unlike the issue
presented by the Pope's pronouncement concerning the duty of a
Catholic judge in a divorce proceeding.48 For although such a pro-
nouncement raises grave issues, it does not present an issue respect-
ing "the relation between law, on the one hand, and, on the other,
generally shared views of right conduct that have grown spontane-
ously through experience and discussion."'49 Pointing to the works
of Austin, Gray, and Hart, Fuller casts additional light on his view of
the matter. When positivists "distinguish law from morality," he
says, "the word 'morality' stands indiscriminately for almost every
conceivable standard by which human conduct may be judged that is
not itself law." 50 It is patent that generally shared views of right con-
duct that have grown spontaneously through experience and discus-
sion constitute standards by which human conduct may be judged;
and, inasmuch as such standards "can hardly be said to be law in the
sense of an authoritative pronouncement"-which, according to
Fuller, is the sense in which a positivist uses the term "law"-it is
hardly surprising to find Fuller saying that here we confront stan-
dards "not of law, but of morality." 51 To drive the point home it
need only be observed that Fuller regards the set of principles that
constitute the morality of law itself as "a form of customary law, in
44 Summers, supra note 3, at 1238.
45 Fuller, supra note 41, at 631.
46 Fuller supra note 41.
47 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
48 The pronouncement in question was made in the Pope's November 7, 1949,
speech to the Central Committee of the Union of Catholic Italian Lawyers. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 8, 1949, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.).
49 Fuller, supra note 41, at 638.
50 Id. at 635.
51 Id. at 639. I have touched on this matter elsewhere. See Wueste, Book Review,
70 ARCHIVES PHIL. L. & Soc. PHIL. 545-48 (1984) (reviewing L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES
OF SOCIAL ORDER (1981)).
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the sense of a system of stabilized interactional expectancies." 52
Putting two and two together, I conclude that as Fuller understands
the positivists' doctrine of separability, one need not argue that
there is a necessary connection between law and critical morality in
order to discredit it.
Unlike Professor Summers's fairness argument, the argument
presented in my review places special emphasis on the concept of
institutional role. Thus, as Professor Summers is quick to point out,
my argument depends on the social facts required to specify the
roles which figure in it. The contrast with his fairness argument is
sharp. The standard or principle of fairness is an element of critical
morality and, as such, it can be divorced from specific social rela-
tions or roles. It is applicable to all forms of human behavior. To
be sure, the exegetical claim briefly defended above comes into play
here. Indeed, as I read Professor Summers, all of the questions he
raises respecting the fidelity of my interpretation of Fuller and the
strength of the argument associated with it relate to this claim. In
this case, however, the issue respecting fidelity is more narrowly
drawn. And as it happens, that works to my advantage. A few re-
marks are therefore in order.
Fuller argues that positivists fail to recognize and appreciate the
morality internal to law because they assume, erroneously, that the
activities of the lawmaking enterprise "are morally neutral except as
the human actions involved may be judged by moral standards ap-
plicable to all forms of human behavior .... What is ruled out by
this view," he says, "is the concept of institutional role-the role of
the citizen, the judge, the lawgiver, the cop on the corner."53 So,
here again, the argument presented in my review is consonant with
Fuller's position respecting the major failing of the positivist's doc-
trine of separability, namely, its incompatibility with the existence of
a morality internal to the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to
the governance of rules.
Professor Summers raises a second objection to my interpreta-
tion. He contends that my construal of the morality of the lawmak-
ing enterprise as a role morality, in the sense of a system of
stabilized interactional expectancies, fails to account for Fuller's
view that his principles constitute standards of moral criticism. Pro-
fessor Summers claims that construed in this way, there are cir-
cumstances in which Fuller's principles "could not serve that
52 Fuller, Law as an Instrument of Social Control and Law as a Facilitation of Human Inter-
action, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 89, 95.
53 L. FULLER, Two Principles of Human Association, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL OR-
DER 75 (K. Winston ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Two Principles]; see also L. FULLER, supra
note 19, at 192-93, 237-38.
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function." 54 More particularly, he argues that my interpretation is
mistaken because Fuller's best-known criticism "in the name of
these very principles" was directed at Hitler's Germany "where one
could hardly say that [these principles] were generally accepted." 55
Focusing on "the degree to which the Nazis observed ... the
inner morality of law itself,"'56 Fuller argues that it is an egregious
error to assume with the positivists that "the only difference be-
tween Nazi law and, say, English law is that the Nazis used their laws
to achieve ends that are odious to an Englishman."5 7 There is an-
other, more important difference: the Nazis disingenuously em-
braced and deliberately exploited "what may be called 'implicit laws
of lawmaking' or limitations on governmental power resting in gen-
erally received conceptions of what is meant by a regime of order
founded on law."58 To be sure, "[t]he German people were notori-
ously deferential toward authority." 59 Yet, as "Hitler shrewdly
saw," their "habit of law observance was not a blind conditioned
reaction toward orders coming from above, but was associated with
a faith in certain fundamental processes of government." 60 Thus,
"Hitler ... strove to preserve.., the familiar outer appearance of
due process" as a "screen for his manipulations. '6 1 He realized that
law observance and the practical efficacy of his regime depended
"on keeping that appearance as close as possible to reality." 62 In
short, as Fuller says, "Where he could without sacrifice, he con-
formed to the demands of legality." 63 And where the result he
sought "would be embarrassed or compromised by those restraints
even the appearance of due process entails," Hitler bypassed legal
forms entirely, acting not through the state, but through the party
"in the streets." 64
If Fuller is right (and I am inclined to think that he is), the Nazis
recognized and exploited the principles of legality. In a manner of
speaking, they were already in place. Exploitation presupposes
something to exploit. Thus, I should say that these principles were
generally accepted in Nazi Germany. But the key point is that the
Nazis' acceptance of these principles was thoroughly disingenuous;
54 Summers, supra note 3, at 1237.
55 Id.
56 Fuller, supra note 41, at 650.
57 Id.
58 L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 65 (Praeger ed. 1968); see Fuller, American Legal
Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 465 (1954); Fuller, supra note 41, at 659.
59 Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 466 (1954).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.; cf. Fuller, supra note 41, at 652.
1986] 1261
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
the element of moral commitment 65 was simply absent. That, I take
it, is Fuller's point.66
In truth, whether the principles of legality were generally ac-
cepted in Nazi Germany is a tangential matter. The main issue
raised by Professor Summers's second objection does not require us
to stand so close to the witches' cauldron. No, what is at issue here
is whether the authoritative status of Fuller's principles turns on
their being accepted; or put another way, whether Fuller regards
"that form of legal morality without which law itself cannot exist" 67
as a social (role) morality.
Decrying the legal positivists' tendency to direct attention
"away from the moral sources of governmental power," 68 Fuller ar-
gues that there is a morality internal to law, a morality, indeed, that
makes law possible. This morality "is not something added to, or
imposed on, the power of law."' 69 It "is an essential condition of
that power itself."70 In short then, according to Fuller, "the power
on which law must rest is essentially a moral power." 7' So far so
good. But what of the issue at hand? Does the authority of Fuller's
principles turn on their acceptance? Fuller speaks to the issue in a
straightforward way in his 1954 article, American Legal Philosophy at
Mid-Century.72 This moral power, he says, "derives from the general
acceptance of the rules by which the law-making process is con-
ducted."' 73 It reflects "the persuasive force of accepted rules." 74 In-
deed, as he goes on to say, the "sanction back of the fundamental
rules of the game, without which the game itself could not go on, is
and can only be general acceptance."75
Reflecting on Fuller's assertion, one may be inclined to ask how
one should understand the term "acceptance." What is it to accept
these fundamental rules of the lawmaking enterprise? I suspect that
this question comes close to the heart of the disagreement between
Professor Summers and myself. Accordingly, I shall conclude this
discussion with some brief remarks addressed to it.
As I suggested in my review, what Fuller has in mind here
emerges clearly in his later work. For example, in Human Interaction
65 See Two Princples, supra note 53, at 75 n.7; Fuller, supra note 59, at 463-64.
66 See Fuller, supra note 41, at 648-61.
67 Id. at 651; see Wueste, supra note 2, at 1217-19.
68 Fuller, supra note 59, at 465.
69 L. FULLER, supra note 19, at 155.
70 Id.
71 Fuller, supra note 59, at 462.
72 Fuller, supra note 59.
73 Id. at 462.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
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and the Law, 76 where he argues that the existence of enacted law as
an effectively functioning normative system depends upon the exist-
ence of stable interactional expectancies between lawgiver and sub-
ject (that is, a morality internal to the legal enterprise), Fuller
indicates that "[w]e shall be misled ... if we suppose that the rele-
vant expectancy or anticipation must enter actively into conscious-
ness." 77 Pointing out that "[o]ur conduct toward others, and our
interpretations of their behavior toward us" 78 are constantly shaped
by expectancies or anticipations that do not rise to consciousness,
Fuller goes on to invite attention to an expectation associated with
the lawmaking enterprise, namely, the expectation of congruence
between the rules as declared and the rules as administered. "Such
anticipations," he explains, "are like the rules of grammar that we
observe in practice without having occasion to articulate them until
they have been conspicuously violated."' 79 For Fuller then, the prin-
ciples of legality or implicit laws of lawmaking are accepted in the
sense in which the rules of grammar are accepted. The claim is in-
triguing. Moreover, it has the ring of truth. After all, as Fuller in-
sists, both the principles of legality and the rules of grammar find
direct expression in the conduct of men toward one another.80
CONCLUSION
In this rebuttal to Professor Summers's disinterested assess-
ment of my review, I have indicated why I find his fairness argument
less than compelling. And I have tried to show that Fuller's essen-
tial purposes are not compromised when his theory is interpreted
along the lines suggested in my review. The dispute between us is,
however, largely intramural. We agree that Fuller's thesis that there
is a morality internal to law is not only defensible, but warrants seri-
ous consideration by contemporary legal philosophers. Indeed, our
disagreement is largely over how to mount the best defense of this
thesis while remaining faithful to Fuller. I therefore submit-and I
suspect Professor Summers would agree-that the nature of our ex-
change is such that, while quite plainly a debate, it is also something
of an invitation to explore the avenues of Fullerian legal philosophy.
76 L. FUI.LER, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER
211 (K. Winston cd. 1981).
77 Id. at 220.
78 Id.
7) Id. at 235.
80 See L. FULLER, supra note 19, at 150-51; L. FULLER, supra note 32, at 211-46.
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